Anthony
David Prigg
Critically Analyse the Implications of the 1905 Russian Revolution
Contents
The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis on why the Russian Revolution of 1905 occurred and how it altered the nature of Russian politics. The effects of the revolution on Russia’s political system, organisations and governance are of primary importance. This analysis is predominantly enclosed within the period of 1860 to 1910 although there are minor references to events slightly outside of this time frame. In the composition of this paper, the author would like to thank Dr. Alexander Chubarov for his generous guidance and support.
In
the history of late Imperial Russia, the 1905 Revolution stands out as decisive
turning point in Russia’s development. Throughout 1905, and even into 1906 and
1907, the centuries-old institution of Tsardom found itself in a very
precarious position – its subjects revolted on an unprecedented scale. The
unrest, which took various forms, was so pervasive that it was felt across the
whole of the country and no sector of society was left unaffected. This historical rupture continues to be
debated by scholars today and the literature available on the subject is quite
expansive, although often it is of a narrative nature. Many have understandably
viewed 1905 as a precursor for the subsequent revolutions of 1917. However,
while it is certainly very interesting to consider the relationship between the
1905 and 1917 revolutions, this extends beyond the scope of this paper.
Furthermore, analysing the 1905 revolution with later events in mind may
distort our perception and produce an inaccurate history. For example, the
victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917 could lead us to overestimate their strength
and importance in the events in 1905.
This
dissertation, by adopting a thematic approach, will be driven by two general
questions. Firstly, what were the causes for social breakdown - how did
political, economic and social factors interlink to push Russia to the edge of
anarchy? The second question is concerned with the immediate political
repercussions this episode may have had. A society that undergoes such a
profound crisis does not come out unscathed, but do the events of 1905 warrant
the title ‘revolution’? Was there a fundamental break with the past, or would
it be more accurate to say that change was evolutionary? This paper will be
concerned with the actual events of the revolution only in so far as how they
relate directly to any causes or consequences; there will be no detailed
documentation of events during 1905 as this would inevitably be very
descriptive in nature. Furthermore, the emphasis of this study is firmly on
politics – political systems, organisation and ideologies.
Having
said this, assessing the reasons for the revolt, the topic of chapter 1, will
necessarily entail a discussion of the social tensions that eventually led to
complete collapse. What were the more deep-rooted reasons for the conflict? How
far back into Russian history should one reach in search of explanations?
Various long-term problems were of course compounded by more immediate issues
that warrant thorough examination also, such as the domestic effects of the
Russo-Japanese War. Chapter 2 will go on to consider and analyse the general
political repercussions of 1905/6 particularly in relation to the government
and Tsar. How did the monarchy respond to this challenge to stability? All the
varied consequences of the revolution will then be scrutinised vis-à-vis
two opposing entities. The first, which will be the purpose of Chapter 3, is
the multitude of oppositional forces which advocated change. How did the
revolution affect the influence and ideology of, say, the Social Democrats or
the Kadets? Chapter 4 will follow on by
assessing the effects of the revolution on Russian conservatism and those who
supported the continued rule of the monarchy. This general group also had an
important role to play in the immediate years after the revolution despite the
fact that they are notably underrepresented in literature on this period.
Chapter 1 - The
Causes of the Revolution
Sidney
Harcave has posited that there were four main dilemmas that confronted Imperial
Russia in the second half of the 19th century: the agrarian problem,
the nationality problem, the labour problem, and the intelligentsia (1964:19-26).
The following chapter will consider how these issues took shape, how the
government responded to them, and how, along with various shorter-term factors,
they served to precipitate the crisis of 1905. Isolating a definitive point of
origin is a tricky task, but it is probably most pertinent and logical to begin
our investigation with the reign of Alexander II, the ‘Tsar Liberator’. The era
of reform under Alexander signifies the first, tangible steps on Russia’s very
unique path to modernity.
During
the early 19th century it became increasingly apparent to the
Russian government that the institution of serfdom was becoming obsolete on
economic and political grounds – ‘While serfdom remained, Russian agriculture
would stagnate and so would the entire Russian economy’ (Christian 1997:73).
Consequently, on the 19th February 1861, Tsar Alexander II decreed
the abolition of serfdom. The emancipation of the serfs transformed the basic
foundation of societal relations within Imperial Russia. The peasantry,
although freed from traditional feudalism, did not receive individual rights to
the land which was subsequently administered on a collective basis. Wood states
that ‘in effect the peasant had merely exchanged bondage to the serf-owner for
bondage to the commune’ (1993:13). The peasants’ demand for land was thus not
fully realised and in fact the average land placed at the peasant’s disposal
was reduced somewhat, and this continued to contract. While a peasant’s average
allotment size in 1887 was 13.2 desiatinas, this became 10.4 desiatinas by 1905
(Rogger 1983:76). This occurred concomitant to massive demographic growth
across Russia. Furthermore, financial pressure on the peasantry was drastically
increased because they were required to compensate the gentry for the land they
acquired in the form of redemption payments.
Despite this, it would be erroneous to presume that the gentry gained
very much from the 1861 reform. As serf-owners, the gentry commanded Russia’s
agricultural productive forces and acted as a local pseudo –judiciary system.
After 1961, dispossessed of their workforce, the nobility had to find new
sources of income and in subsequent years contributed to the growing merchant
and business classes and, in general, the pluralisation of Russian society. The
breaking of the bond between serf and serf-owner intensified the process of
societal diversification that had been relatively gradual up until the reform.
Such
elementary structural changes could not be isolated and were necessarily
matched with other significant political reforms. Of these, developments in local
administrative and judicial structures were the most consequential. Zemstvos and
Municipal Dumas, created as instruments of local self-governance, were elected
bodies which had a certain democratic nature to them. These institutions
politicised ordinary Russians as it provided them with experience of
participatory politics. For much of the gentry, whose political role was
reduced by emancipation, the zemstvos were a vehicle for regaining their lost
influence and, in hindsight, thus served to foster the growth of liberalism.
The judicial reforms were of equal importance in that, while naturally having
some restrictions, they formed the beginnings of a judicial system independent
of the government. Justices in lower judicial organs were elected by the
zemstvos and municipal dumas and the courts also began to use trial by jury
(Polunov 2005:119). Alexander’s reforms
served to devolve political, legal and economic power to the localities and
thus make conditional the Emperor’s supposed ‘unlimited’ power. As a symptom of
this evolution, the rest of Alexander’s reign witnessed a battle for control
between the government and the new institutions.
Alexander
II’s reign also had to confront the burgeoning of the social group termed the
intelligentsia, whose emergence was traceable to the diversification of
traditional social structures. Throughout the 19th century we can
identify the ‘appearance of spheres of activity and sources of livelihood for
educated and ambitious men outside of state service’ (Rogger 1983:132).
Entrepreneurship offered one path as did employment as teachers and statisticians
under the zemstvos and dumas. This fissiparous group encapsulated by the term
‘intelligentsia’ had less allegiance to Russia’s political system in comparison
say to the landed gentry which had a long tradition of serving the autocracy.
This became more pronounced as the social base of the intelligentsia gradually
altered – it was increasingly composed of ‘men of mixed ranks’, or
raznochintsy, as opposed to those of noble birth. Under Alexander a ‘freer intellectual
atmosphere’ (Chubarov 1999:84) prevailed, attributable to milder censorship
laws and a more autonomous and inclusive education system, which accommodated
the augmentation of this social faction. The intelligentsia articulated various
political ideologies, such as Alexander Herzen’s ‘Populism’, and became
progressively more radical through the 1860s and 1870s. This was rooted in
disappointment in the practical effects of the emancipation of the serfs, the
apparent unwillingness of the peasants to revolt, and ‘in particular by the refusal of autocracy
to contemplate political reform consistent with the social and economic changes
taking place in Russia’ (Offord 1999:102). The intelligentsia would come to
play a progressively more prominent part in the opposition to the autocracy,
but even under Alexander II it was vociferous and active enough that the
People’s Will, one of the more radical organisations, succeeded in
assassinating the ‘Tsar Liberator’ on 1st March 1881.
The
subsequent reign of Alexander III is arguably of even greater importance than
that of his father. If his father’s governance could be said to of tentatively
set Russia on the path to modernisation, Alexander III firmly rejected this
development and even tried to reverse it. His ‘Manifesto on Unshakeable
Autocracy’ declared ‘the voice of God commands us to take up vigorously the
task of governing ... with faith in the strength and truth of the autocratic
power that we have been called upon to affirm and safeguard for the popular
good from any infringement’ (cited in Polunov 2005:177). Alexander III’s rule
thus did not advocate social or political reform in any way and violently
suppressed revolutionaries and dissidents. Such tactics were able to
temporarily paralyse the growth of liberalism and left-wing radicalism, but it
certainly did not resolve the issue and in the long-term only contributed to
the radicalisation and proliferation of political opposition - the calm was
merely superficial. A police state was
established largely through the ‘Temporary Regulations to Protect State
Security and Public Order’, and this was most vividly symbolised by the
creation of the Okhrana, the covert political police. Alexander sought control
not merely through the physical means of the Okhrana, but also by limiting the
political initiative of the municipal dumas and zemstvos. Their political and
financial prerogatives were curtailed, and in 1889 they came under the
supervision of the ‘land captain’ who was directly responsible to the minister
of the interior (Riasanovsky and Steinberg 2005:365); the new post was simply
an extension of the central bureaucracy into local government. Further
limitations were placed on thought and knowledge, the autonomy of the
universities granted under Alexander II being rescinded by the University
Statutes of 1884 and 1887.
It
is under Alexander III that the ‘nationality problem’ also begins to arise as a
direct repose to the Tsar’s misguided policy of Russification. In accordance
with this policy, all other languages and religions were subjugated to that of
the Russian language and the Orthodox Church, despite the fact that ethnic
Russians only made up 43.3 percent of the population in 1897 (Weeks 1999:118)
and the empire contained 110 different nationalities (Spulber 2003:8). The
assault on Jewish rights was particularly vindictive: ‘Over 600 new measures
were introduced, imposing severe social, political and economic restrictions on
the Jewish population’ (Lynch 1992:20). Russification attempted to homogenise a
nation reputed for its ethnic diversity. Maynard astutely indicates that the
high ratio of non-Russians in the revolutionary movement was the consequence of
the Tsar’s ill-conceived policy (1962:73). On an economic level Alexander’s
rule was also of some significance. Russia embarked on, at first quite tentatively,
a process of state-led industrialisation which later accelerated under the
aegis of Finance Minister Sergei Witte, appointed in 1892. The harsh conditions
that prevailed in the urban centres was recognised by Nikolai Bunge, Finance
Minister 1881-87, by the enactment of various laws which regulated labour
conditions, such as the payment of wages and fines. Bunge was later forced out
of his post however because he suggested that these laws were just a first step
and that more extensive legislation needed to follow (Polunov 2005:181)The
proletariat, so feared by successive Russian governments as a revolutionary
force, was now in the making under the official sponsorship of the state.
By
the beginning of Nicholas’ reign in 1894 the negative effects of rapid
industrialisation were becoming increasingly apparent. The massive influx of
citizens, predominantly peasants, into the cities and towns ‘led to
overcrowding and to severe living conditions’ (Spulber 2003:18). Under the
illusory belief that industrial relations were ‘paternalistic’, the government
largely neglected to legislate on worker-employer relations following the brief
work of Nikolai Bunge. One experiment that had shown a degree of prospect was
‘police socialism’ under Sergei Zubatov, although, once again, this project was
terminated before it was properly begun. Furthermore, workers’ wages remained
depressed even with Russian GDP growing at a considerable rate; at the turn of
the century the average wage of a Russian worker was only between a quarter to
a third of Western European workers (Chubarov 1999:120). The industrialisation
drive did not only excessively exploit the working class but was evidently a
great burden for the peasantry as well. On top of redemption payments, the
peasants had to fund Russia’s industrialisation through taxes, particularly
indirect taxes on items such as vodka and sugar (Hutchinson 1999:34/5). Failure
to invest capital combined with lack of technological development ensured the
stagnation of agricultural production and the continued destitution and low
living standards of the peasants.
Another comparison with Western Europe is elucidating: the death rate in
rural Russia was nearly double that of England (Ascher 1988: 26). ‘Industry,
therefore, far from bringing benefit to the mass of Russians, actively
contributed to their impoverishment’ (Kochan 1966:3/4). To complicate matters
for the autocracy, opposition among the intelligentsia was organising and
taking on greater proportions. This was in part due to the necessities of an
economically modernising state, and also because of the continual
imperviousness of the polity to reform. Moreover, ‘workers – and occasionally
peasants – were beginning to recognise oppositional organizations as
instruments capable of giving form to their discontent and strength to their
aspirations’ (Harcave 1964:29); the efforts of the radicals and liberals to
politicise the masses was finally yielding dividends. For example, the workers
involved in the strike at Baku in December 1904 demanded the convocation of a
constituent assembly and basic civil rights.
Three
short-term factors served to transform social malaise into outright rebellion.
The global depression at the start of the twentieth century found weak prey in
the form of the instable and developing Russian economy. Foreign trade declined
accordingly and a significant rise in unemployment occurred. In 1904 the desire
to expand economically in the Far East, or more particularly Manchuria and
Korea, brought Russia into competition with Japan, another power which had
begun to modernise rapidly at the end of the nineteenth century. Once again,
the Russian military machine proved too weak and each ‘major Russian defeat in
the Far East unleashed tremors thousands of miles to the west’ (Kochan 1966:
68). The final issue that pushed Russia over the precipice was the massacre of
workers outside the Winter Palace on their way to presenting a petition to the
Tsar. Bloody Sunday, as that day is infamously known, seemed to reveal without
any reservation the futility of trying to negotiate with the increasingly
detached autocracy.
Overall,
the failure of Tsars Alexander III and Nicholas II to recognise and respond to
the progressively convoluted stratification of Russian society led to ubiquitous
social discontent which eventually erupted in January 1905. Any significant
attempt to recognise the needs of the new social groups, such as the workers
and the intelligentsia, was quickly nipped in the bud. Tsar Nicholas’
perception of Russia remained firmly based on the peasant and noble classes.
Even with this anachronistic outlook the government failed to realise the needs
of the peasantry, which became increasingly impoverished, and those of the
nobility as well, which hoped to combat the waning of its political and
economic influence. In effect, Russia suffered from an inept and unresponsive
political leadership incapable of adapting to the evolution of Russian society.
‘Ultimately, of course, the reputation as well as the viability of an autocratic
regime depend on the political sagacity and competence of the ruler’ (Ascher
1988:14). This intractable problem created an environment conducive to
revolt. The gradual deterioration of
relations between state and society led Leo Tolstoy to comment that ‘it is
impossible to maintain this form of government except by violence’ (cited in
Lynch 1992:45). This was temporarily achieved through the establishment of a
police state under Alexander III, although by the time of Nicholas’ reign this
system was not strong enough to contain growing social unrest. Underlying, and
to a large extent responsible, for these issues was the need to compete on an
international level, and more specifically within Europe. Defeat in the Crimean
War abruptly raised ‘the question of the future course of Russia’s development’
(Spulber 2003:3).The political leadership’s desire for the Russian Empire to
remain a strong economic and military power drove Russia down the path of
modernisation. It was the inability of the autocracy in subsequent years to
ameliorate the more negative aspects of its economic and social reform, as well
as matching this with political reorganization, that caused such widespread
social discontent.
Chapter 2 - The
Revolution and the Government and Tsar’s Response
It is not the intent of this chapter to contemplate the
actual events of the 1905 uprising in any extensive detail. However, a brief
historical outline is necessary in order to contextualise the main concern of
this section, that being the autocracy’s response to the unrest and how this
shaped government policy in Russia in the ensuing three years. What effects,
both ephemeral and enduring, did the revolution have on Russia’s political and
governmental practices?
As
already pointed to in the previous chapter, the initial spark that ignited
social discontent was the massacre of the peaceful procession of petitioning
workers outside the Winter Palace in January of 1905. In the week immediately
following, the main cities within the Empire were paralysed by widespread
strikes from industrial workers. It took only a short time for this unrest to
disseminate outward into rural Russia in the form of strikes, seizure of land
and attacks upon the property of the nobility. Throughout 1905 the army was
called in over 3,000 times to quell rural revolt (Waldron 1998:115/6). Urban
unrest which had lulled during the spring and summer rose again and in October
reached its apex in the General Strike. The non-Russian provinces, notably
Poland, Finland and the Caucasus and Baltic regions were areas of intense
instability as political and economic issues were accentuated by nationalist
demands. Moreover, the state’s capacity for coercion and repression was
considerably weakened as the government was caught off guard and the army,
which in any case had not shown itself completely impervious to revolt, was
still in the process of returning from the East. The Tsar granted certain concessions
throughout the year to appease the population but they were not extensive
enough and only acted to encourage further unrest and bolster the demands of
the political groups. For example, the reestablishment of university autonomy
in August did not quell student protest but simply provided a useful venue for
political meetings (Seton-Watson 1967:600). Under the intense pressure
generated by the October General Strike the Tsar finally conceded, with the
encouragement of Witte, major political concessions through the proclamation of
the October Manifesto. This piece of legislation heralded the beginning of a
new phase in Russian political history.
The
October Manifesto can be seen as a quasi-constitution in that it promulgated
certain basic laws that were to shape Russian politics. It afforded Russians
the basic civil liberties of ‘real personal inviolability, freedom of
conscience, speech, assembly and union’ (cited in McCauley 1984:13). These
liberties signified a drastic change in the relations between state and society
in that they should theoretically prohibit arbitrary and authoritarian rule
which had been the nature of autocratic governance prior to 1905. In reality
these ideals were certainly not fully upheld by the government in the period after
the issuance of the manifesto. There still existed a degree of censorship of
the press (Waldron 1998:64/5) and the formation and activities of the growing
trade union movement were dogged by government interference (Maynard 1962:89).
The Manifesto further enacted changes to the fundamental structure of the
Russian polity. Prior to 1905 government organisation was characterised by
competition between the various units due to obscure departmental
jurisdictions, incoordination, and lack of basic procedural guidelines. This
frequently led to departments following contradictory policies. The Manifesto
attempted to remedy this situation by establishing the position of Chairman of
the Council of Ministers which now represented a cabinet along western European
lines. Theoretically, this individual would harmonise and systemise government
actions. Again, however, there were clear obstacles. The ‘law stipulated the prime minister’s
power in only the vaguest terms’ (Kropotkin 2008:6) - Nicholas was disinclined
to empower any one individual in that it might dilute his own prerogatives and
the ministers within the government also jealously guarded their traditional
autonomy from impingement by other officials (Waldron 1998:34). Clearly,
however, the most significant stipulation of the October Manifesto was the
granting of a parliament, the State Duma. Through this institution, Russian
citizens would be able to directly contribute to the political process and
this, more than anything else, signified the transition of the Russian
political system from an autocracy to a constitutional and parliamentary
monarchy. In legislative terms, the Tsar’s rule was no longer absolute but
conditional.
The
process of political reform begun by the October Manifesto was just one half of
the government’s two-fold strategy to resolve the social discord that enveloped
Russia through 1905 and well into 1906 and 1907. The government also began to
reassert its authority by actively suppressing dissent, the method of rule that
had predominated prior to 1905. This strategy to some extent conflicted with
attempts to provide basic, uniform civil liberties and also revealed the
state’s continuing inclination to revert to arbitrary rule through the use of
force. In December 1905 the government began to dispatch punitive army
expeditions into the provinces to restore order (Mehlinger and Thompson
1972:106) which were indiscriminate and ruthless in their tactics. 39 provinces
were either partially or entirely placed under martial law and field courts-martial
were established which ordered the execution of thousands of Russians. In
contrast, for the previous 80 years the average was nine executions per year
(Loginov 2004:23/4). Many supposed dissidents were also arrested - ‘prisons
became so overcrowded that the administrations frequently turned to the
zemstvos to ask for more accommodation’ (Weber 1995:156). In addition, the new
Minister of the Interior P.N. Durnovo resolved to purge the civil service of
those deemed to be undesirable elements and this process was further extended
into some professions, notably teaching and medical practice (Ascher
1992:26/7). The Russian state, while temporarily paralysed in 1905, still
largely retained the support of its two most important pillars: the army and
the bureaucracy. The loyalty of these two institutions permitted the state to
react brutally to social insurrection and effectively crush the revolution.
Clearly
then, the Tsar and his government were regaining their confidence which had
been so severely traumatized by the October General Strike and the widespread
protest in 1905. This evolution in government attitude was also reflected on a
political level. In February 1906 the State Council, previously merely an
advisory body, was constituted as a second parliamentary house. Half of the
Council was selected by the Tsar and the other half by specified social groups
such as the clergy and the gentry (Riasanovsky and Steinberg 2005:382). With
legislative rights equal to the Duma, the State Council, inevitably bound to be
conservative in nature, undermined the representative spirit of the Duma and
restrained its authority, for the Tsar, rightly so, feared the Duma would make
radical demands of the government. The Fundamental Laws promulgated in April
1906, only days before the convocation of the Duma, reveal the extent to which
the autocracy had recuperated. These Laws confirmed in greater detail the
pseudo-constitution granted the previous year and unquestionably served to
assert the dominance of the executive, and therefore the Tsar, over the
legislature. Government ministers largely remained answerable to the Tsar and
could only be appointed and released by him (Chubarov 1999:153). The laws
further declared that the Tsar ‘is the supreme conductor of all foreign relations
of the Russian State’ and that ‘He possesses supreme command over all military
and naval forces’ (cited in Mehlinger and Thompson 1972:337). Most infamously,
Article 87 stated the Tsar could introduce legislation when the Duma was not in
session, thus providing Nicholas and his government a method of circumventing
the parliament. The Fundamental Laws were further declared to be unchangeable
by the Duma according to Article 8; only the Tsar held this prerogative
(McCauley 1984:22). The sum effect was to seriously debilitate the power and
influence of the Duma and to ensure the overarching authority of the
sovereign.
When
the Duma was convened on the 27th April 1906, despite the very
limited scope granted by the Fundamental Laws, it still retained the ability to
propose and deny the passing of legislation – the Duma was far from a rubber
stamp legislature. Despite the boycott of many of the left-wing parties, the
Duma’s composition was clearly very radical, more radical in fact than the
government expected. The government had anticipated, quite erroneously, that
the majority of the peasant population still harboured conservative sentiments
which would see them elect more moderate candidates (Oberländer 1971:67).
Instead, the peasantry elected a large number of non-partisans, as well as
deputies who would coalesce to form the radical Trudovik Party; both were
certainly not moderate, and endeavoured through the Duma to acquire more land
for the peasants. The left and moderate left, largely represented by the
Trudoviks and the Kadet Party, dominated the First Duma with approximately 60
percent of the deputies (Mehlinger and Thompson 1972:279). From the first
session to the last, the government’s relations with the Duma were very
strained. Under the leadership of Chairman Goremykin, much of the government
clearly viewed the Duma with derision and an affront to their responsibilities
as civil servants. Even so, there were some attempts under Witte then Goremykin
to recruit some members of the Duma into the cabinet (Harcave 1964:209). The
invite was largely restricted to the Octobrists and other conservative elements
that did not, as they informed the government, represent the majority of the
Duma. Both sides were also unprepared to compromise on key political issues
such as the land question, the rights of minorities and further political
reform such as the calling of a constituent assembly. Consequently, Nicholas declared the Duma
dissolved on the 8th July 1906.
In
the same month Peter Stolypin was appointed Chairman of the Council of
Ministers. Stolypin, although clearly viewing the Duma as a subordinate
institution to that of the government, adopted a more conciliatory stance
toward the legislature. However, the relations between the parties in the
second Duma and the government proved even more intractable as the left-wing
parties that had boycotted the first Duma sent deputies to the second. During
the 103 days of its existence, the Duma ‘adopted only three measures, one of
which was turned down by the State Council’ (Ascher 1992:318). Evidently an
impasse had been reached and once again the Tsar found a pretext for the
dissolution of the legislature. The seemingly insuperable gap between the
government’s intentions and those of much of the Duma resulted in the
government significantly altering the electoral law to make the Duma more
compliant with the will of the government and autocrat. As a result of the
changes approximately ‘only one in six of the male population had the right to
vote’ (Lynch 1992:52) and the more conservative elements in Russian society,
such as the gentry, were given greater representation in the Duma to the
detriment of the peasantry and urban working class. According to the
Fundamental Laws a change to the electoral law had to be approved by the Duma –
Article 87 stated that while the sovereign could pass emergency laws, these
could not ‘introduce changes ... in the regulations governing elections to the
Council and the Duma’ (cited in McCauley 1984:24). This step, more than any other,
signified the inability and reluctance of the old political establishment to
adapt to the post-1905 environment which demanded the recognition of the
political aspirations of the Russian population.
Despite
the contravention of the Fundamental Laws and the contempt this emphasised for
constitutional and parliamentary processes, the government did not wholly lose
the motivation for reform which had been inculcated by the revolution. While
the reforms demanded by the Duma were too drastic, under Stolypin’s premiership
there were attempts at initiating reforms in certain areas although they were
often met with resistance. Laws to extend the rights of certain religious
minorities were stymied by the State Council and Stolypin’s plans to increase
the responsibilities and autonomy of the zemstvos was not approved by other members
of the government (Kryzhanovskii cited in McCauley 1984:51/2). Unsurprisingly,
the Tsar also was an obstruction to reform. When Stolypin proposed to lift to
some of the restrictions on Jewish liberties the Tsar refused to approve such
reforms (Levin 1973:123). The most important problem however in Russia at this
time was still the land question and in this area Stolypin had the most success
in achieving his reform agenda. Even this though had to be introduced through
use of Article 87 in November 1906, and was not passed by the legislature until
it had already been in action for several years and thus could not
realistically be reversed.
This era in Russian history is dominated by the question: had Russia become a constitutional monarchy and was it on the path to further democratisation, or was it simply a facade induced by the Tsar to retain his own authority? Weber is strongly sceptical concluding that ‘Russia is ‘not ready’ for meaningful constitutional reform’ (1995:107) whereas alternatively Waldron takes a more optimistic stance: ‘even though Nicholas II wanted to believe that his authority remained undiminished, the intervention of the Duma and the State Council in the legislative process severely reduced the monarch’s freedom of action’ (1998:120/1). One could approach this question from either angle with substantial evidence to support each position. Weber is right in arguing that the ‘Tsar himself never sincerely intended the transformation of Russia into a constitutional state’ (1995: 152). There was a greater degree of acceptance within government circles, notably under the leadership of Stolypin, for the need to consult and cooperate with the Duma. The fact remained, however, that the Tsar retained complete authority over the government and also maintained the intiative in matters of legislation. He could dismiss the Duma as he pleased, circumvent it by utilising article 87, and veto any laws proposed by the legislature. Ostensibly he could completely ignore it altogether as evidenced by the change to the electoral law. It is clear that constitutionalism and democratic participation were not ideals that were upheld by the autocracy as on multiple occasions it attempted to limit the Duma. Conversely, the Tsar and the government clearly never believed that it had the authority to completely abolish what had been granted in late 1905 and early 1906 as the Duma continued to play a role in Russian politics up until the 1917 revolution. A fundamental shift in political discourse had certainly occurred and Russia’s political system reflected this – Russia had begun to move toward a more constitutional and democratic form of governance. Denial on the part of the Tsar to recognise this development and the enactment of certain retrograde steps would indicate that further political reform in the post-1905 era was exceedingly unlikely though.
Chapter 3 – The
Forces for Change: Revolutionaries and Reformists
This
chapter will seek to discuss and analyse the ‘opposition’ movement during the
revolution and how it evolved in the fundamentally modified political
environment after 1905. In order to do this it is first necessary to define
what we mean by the rather vague term ‘opposition’. Opposition parties fall
under two general headings: the first group is the revolutionary parties that
fundamentally opposed the construct of Tsardom and for this reason did not
fully embrace the post-1905 political system. The second group consists of parties
more reformist in nature. They focused on encouraging further social and
economic reform through the Duma, and were either content with the post-1905
political system promulgated by the October Manifesto or perceived it as a base
for further political reform. Under this definition, the Octobrists are
classified as an oppositionist group because, despite being more moderate, they
still opposed the government on certain policy areas and also fully adhered to
the idea of constitutional monarchy which, as established in the previous
chapter, was never truly supported by the Emperor. In addition to the Octobrist
Party, this chapter will focus on the Kadets, Social Democrats and Socialist
Revolutionaries. These parties, while not encapsulating the whole of the opposition
(there were innumerable other parties, especially ones concerned with the
rights of ethnic minorities) proved to be the most influential and popular in
Russia after 1905. It is also important to bear in mind that the definition
articulated above is quite basic and only really useful just to begin our
discussion with; it does not fully capture the complexity and fluidity of
Russian oppositionist politics in this period. Hopefully the ensuing chapter
will provide greater substance and clarity.
We
shall first begin by appraising the revolutionary parties: how did the
revolution affect their organisation, ideologies and programs? At the party’s
second congress in 1903 a schism had started to develop within Social Democracy
leading to the creation of two factions: the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The
tumultuous events of 1905 temporarily brought the factions closer together in
their efforts to further the revolution (Liebich 1999:23); this alliance was
somewhat artificial however and did not last. In fact, the revolution led to
the Bolsheviks, through Lenin’s theorising, rethinking their fundamental
political assumptions on two key aspects. Firstly, Lenin argued that the
pervasive unrest in the countryside signalled that the peasantry, traditionally
believed to be inert and largely apolitical, had a great degree of
revolutionary potential. Furthermore, Lenin contended the bourgeois classes had
capitulated at the first sign of government reform. Thus the bourgeoisie, which
was originally considered the workers’ prime ally in the assault on Tsardom,
was displaced by the peasantry – the Bolsheviks now sought a ‘democratic
dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry’ (cited in Seton-Watson
1967:605) Secondly, the near ubiquitous social discontent of 1905 and the
politically timid nature of the bourgeoisie encouraged Lenin to believe that
Marx’s concept of two very separate revolutions, the liberal-bourgois and then
the socialist revolution, could be altered in Russian circumstances. Rather
than having an indeterminate pause between the two revolutions, they may occur
nigh on simultaneously. Should the bourgeois revolution occur (this must have
seemed imminent in 1905), then Social Democrats, as representatives of the
workers, must participate in and try to control the newly-established
liberal-democratic government if the opportunity arose thus radicalising the
bourgois revolution (Chubarov 1999:126). In tactical terms this ideological
alteration proved a significant advantage for Bolsheviks in garnering working
class support – the socialist revolution was not necessarily in the distant
future but may be effected at the present time.
In
some ways the Mensheviks drew diametrical conclusions from 1905. ‘The
experience of that year had convinced Martov that the preconditions for the
victory of the proletariat did not yet exist’ (Rogger 1983:231). Capitalism
still needed to develop further and Mensheviks still perceived the peasantry to
be of little value as a revolutionary force. The upheaval of 1905 further necessitated
that the Mensheviks formulate a stance on the possibility of a bourgeois
revolution. In this respect also, Mensheviks had different ideas to their
fellow Marxists, believing that Social Democracy ‘must remain the party of the
extreme revolutionary opposition’ (cited in McCauley 1984:30) and not
participate in the anticipated bourgeois revolution. It could be said then that
while the revolution had furthered affirmed the Mensheviks’ traditional Marxist
convictions, the Bolsheviks under Lenin had begun to significantly change their
ideological stance in congruence with what they saw as Russia’s peculiar
domestic conditions. The incorporation of the peasantry within the Leninist
interpretation of Marxism, and the belief in the immediacy of the socialist
revolution also reflected a merger of Marxist doctrine with that of the
long-standing populist tradition within Russia. This largely explains the
Bolsheviks’ inclination to ally, if necessary, with the Socialist
Revolutionaries (Weber 1995:67) in contrast to the Mensheviks who were more
favourably disposed to the radical liberals.
Ideological
differences engendered other tactical differences, although there still
remained a significant degree of convergence and cooperation. Throughout 1905
and much of 1906 the Bolsheviks attempted to remain aloof from the process of
unionisation occurring across Russia. The attempts of workers to unite and
achieve economic concessions from the government would assuage workers’ social
and financial degradation and consequently attenuate their revolutionary zeal;
concessions would obscure the necessity of revolution. Conversely, the
Mensheviks, who anticipated the socialist revolution occurring in the distant
future, were very active in infiltrating the various unions and cooperatives
with the hope of preparing Russians for the bourgeois-liberal revolution.
Despite some significant changes, differences between the two factions were
often more of emphasis rather than being fundamental in nature; the two
factions maintained similar programmes and their attitude toward the Russian
political system was analogous. For example, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks
boycotted the first Duma, Lenin believing it gave Russians ‘constitutional
illusions’ (cited in Mehlinger and Thompson 1972:264). Equally, both factions
resolved to participate in elections to the second Duma, the Bolsheviks now
viewing the Duma as a stage off of which to preach revolutionary propaganda,
whereas some Mensheviks also believed the ‘Duma itself could develop into an
organ of power’ (Ascher 1992:280).
The
Socialist Revolutionary Party (also PSR or SRs) is the other key party in the
revolutionary camp. While the PSR had been an official organisation since
1901/2, it was an extremely disjointed party and not until late 1905 did it
hold its first congress and endeavour to produce a universal, common program.
Historians have typically viewed the SRs as an agrarian party overwhelmingly
concerned with the lot of the Russian peasantry in contrast to Marxists’ emphasis
on the proletariat. Indeed, SRs were heirs to the 19th century
populist tradition, which had often argued that capitalism, and by implication
a proletariat, could not and would not develop in Russia. It is important to
note though that Socialist Revolutionaries did recognise the value of the
working classes, at least as an adjunct to the revolutionary movement, and
particularly after the seemingly ubiquitous dissent that gripped urban Russia
in 1905. Accordingly, the party’s program, developed during 1904 and adopted at
the first congress, has a sizeable section supporting greater labour
regulations such as minimum wages and a workers’ insurance scheme (cited in
Harcave 1964:270/1). Having said this, there was certainly still an emphasis on
the peasantry and this class constituted most of the PSR’s popular support. The
party supported the agrarian policy of land socialisation, meaning the
allocation of all land, including private land, to the peasant communes thus
fulfilling the peasants’ desire for land without reservations.
The
fundamental change to the political system commenced by the October Manifesto
naturally brought about various organisational and tactical changes within the
PSR. One of the recurrent issues after 1905 was the role of the PSR’s Battle
Organisation and the topic of political terrorism. Was such underground,
extralegal activity necessary now that political organisation and agitation had
largely been legalised? This quandary continually divided the party: the
moderate wing saw legal methods of struggle as legitimate and advantageous
whereas the radicals demanded the continuation and intensification of terrorist
activity. The issue endangered the unity of the party with both poles
threatening to break away; many of the moderates did in fact leave the party to
establish the Popular Socialist Party (Melancon 1999:80). The PSR also had to
decide on its approach to the parliamentary politics proposed by the October
Manifesto. In this respect the SRs response was similar to that of the Social
Democrats. The Party’s commitment to revolution was seen to preclude any
involvement in the new parliamentary institution and the first Duma was
boycotted. The SRs participated in the second Duma, but disillusion with the
government following the Duma’s dissolution and its increasing tendency to
renege on its constitutional obligations led to the PSR largely reverting back
to its underground activities and also its exploits within the various labour
unions and cooperatives (Melancon 1999:81/2).
The
liberal movement that developed prior to 1905 had an even weaker organisational
structure than that of the radical left. The revolution however sped up the
amalgamation process and the various political parties that resulted were
legitimised by the October Manifesto. The Constitutional Democratic Party
crystallised in mid-1905 before political organisations were even legalised,
indicating to some extent the radical nature of the liberalism the party
embodied. Drawn from the intelligentsia and the zemstvos, the Kadets were
fundamentally hostile to Tsardom and held a westernised view of Russian
development: the monarchy must either be subjugated to a constitutional and
parliamentary legislature or got rid of entirely and replaced with a republic.
Furthermore, through years of opposition and first-hand experience of the
plight of the Russian masses this strand of liberalism developed a fairly close
affinity toward the socialist parties and also a strong commitment to extensive
social reform. Section VII of the party’s program included introduction of the
eight-hour working day, freedom of trade unions, the right to strike, and
governmental insurance for workers (cited in Harcave 1964:298/9). The Kadets
also further advocated the enlargement of peasant lands to the detriment of the
state, monarchical and, if necessary, private lands.
Many
commentators have been critical of these radical tendencies (Stockdale
1999:158) and rightly determine that they acted as a barrier to potential
cooperation with the government during 1905 and 1906. Even though the Kadets
were prepared to accept the October Manifesto as a base point for political
change they continually demanded further political reform, notably the
gathering of a constituent assembly and revision of the Fundamental Laws
established in April (Riasanovsky and Steinberg 2005:384). This, along with
other reforms, they demanded of the government when the first Duma met in 1906,
contributing a great deal to the alienation of the legislature from the
executive. The Kadets were the single largest party in the Duma, thanks largely
to its program which had mass appeal and the Party’s very active approach to
electioneering in the early months of 1906. The unity of the Kadets remained a
constant issue however, in large part due to the party’s attempts to provide a
wide-ranging political program which demanded a high degree of consensus. The
party was often divided over issues such as nationality and Jewish policy and
there were significant differences of opinion between intellectuals and
zemstvy, and the provincial and central party leadership. What resulted was
‘highly ambiguous language or less than perfect compromise tactics in order to
satisfy their disparate groups’ (Stockdale 199:163).
A
noticeable turning point in the development of the Constitutional Democratic
Party was reached with the dismissal of the First Duma in July 1906.
Disillusioned with the government and Tsar, the Kadets along with many of the
Trudovik deputies met in Vyborg, Finland, where they issued the Vyborg
Manifesto. This was essentially an illegal act, as it called for all Russians
to resist the collection of taxes and conscription to the army. The
populations’ response was apathetic to say the least and many deputies were
arrested and prohibited from participation in the second Duma; the party was
discredited and the Manifesto ‘permanently soured its relations with the
government’ (Waldron 1998:56). This whole episode revealed the fragility of the
opposition – it could not rely on social protest to achieve further concessions
- and that the pre-eminence of the government and the Tsar had been firmly
re-established. The Party was forced to
accommodate for this power shift and its approach was much more defensive and
conciliatory in subsequent Dumas. They stopped demanding a constituent assembly
and cabinet consisting of Duma deputies (Ascher 1992:279) This slight move to
the right aligned the Kadets more closely with their liberal counterparts, the
Octobrists, with whom they sometimes cooperated with in the third and fourth
Dumas (Polunov 2005:227).
Ascher
has stated that the Party of October 17, referred to as the Octobrists, ‘can be
regarded as the most moderate wing within liberalism or the most liberal wing
within conservatism’ (1992:31). The former classification is certainly more
tenable. Like their name suggests, the Octobrists believed the political system
established by the October Manifesto was the most suitable for Russia; they
were neither democrats nor advocates of unlimited monarchical power, but
constitutionalists who favoured a parliamentary monarchy. Both this, and the
Party’s dedication to basic civil liberties, incontrovertibly places the
Octobrists within the Russian liberal camp. However, along with outright
rejection of parliamentary democracy, two other key issues separated the
Octobrists’ brand of liberalism from that of the more radical Constitutional
Democrats. The first was complete dedication to the unity of the Russian Empire
and thus Octobrists rejected the call for political autonomy by national
minorities (Pavlov 1999:185) and forsook the support of these groups. The
second was an unwavering commitment to the rule of law which meant the
Octobrists largely supported the government in its suppression of revolutionary
activity, although some viewed its actions as somewhat excessive (Pavlov
1999:180). Due to these differences, the Octobrists were sometimes inclined, at
least initially, to form alliances with the more conservative parties to its
right.
Nevertheless,
the end of the revolution in 1906 and 1907 caused the opening of a rift between
the government and the Octobrists, although this process was quite gradual and
imperceptible at first. The Octobrists continued to offer a significant degree
of support to Stolypin’s government – Stolypin’s attempts to reform agriculture
by removing the commune and encouraging private farming, along with his
intentions to reform local government, overlapped considerably with the program
of the Octobrists (Waldron 1998:153). However, once stability had been
re-established across the country the government continued to renege on its
commitments to civil liberties and often used Article 87 to bypass the Duma.
These actions contravened the core principles of the Party and caused the slow
deterioration of its relations with the government and its supporters. This
eventually resulted in the Octobrist leader Guchkov resigning his post as
Chairman of the Duma in 1911 and declaring at the Party Conference in 1913: the
‘attempt made by the Russian public, as represented by our party, to effect a
peaceful, painless transition from the old condemned system to a new order has
failed’ (cited in Lynch 1992:54).
In conclusion, prior to the 1905 revolution and the October Manifesto opposition toward the autocracy generally lacked coherence and organisation chiefly due to the repressive state apparatus and the relatively limited politicisation of ordinary Russians. The revolution, although largely spontaneous and many strikes being concerned with economic matters, did serve to politicise many Russians as the various radical and liberal parties succeeded in penetrating and influencing the incipient union movement. The October Manifesto, by legalising political organisations and creating a parliament, demanded the ‘embryonic political parties’ (Mehlinger and Thompson 1972:252) that existed before 1905 to evolve into properly organised parties with an identifiable ideology and program. This process was unsurprisingly very difficult, protracted and complex - divisions within social democracy hardened and the liberal parties seemed in constant danger of disintegrating. Furthermore, political organisation remained under the constant scrutiny of the government which did not fully uphold the spirit of October Manifesto. When the parties assembled in the new legislature, the Duma proved to be very fragmented and also extremely hostile to the government. There are two main reasons for these traits. The first is that the various parties that formed and participated in the Duma had only a short history of political participation and thus found it difficult to compromise; the first two Dumas may have been able to exert more pressure on the government if the parties were more willing to coordinate their efforts. The second explanation is that decades of reaction on the part of the autocracy had progressively radicalised the opposition and the list of necessary reforms gradually accumulated. The more radical parties received more support from the population than the conservatives, such as the Octobrists, precisely because moderate reform was not viewed as viable anymore – fundamental and extensive reform was required. Despite widespread disillusionment with the governance of the Russian Empire it would be fallacious to believe that the whole of Russia had now turned against Tsardom. On the contrary, there still existed strongly conservative elements in Russian society and many still pledged fealty to the autocrat. These groups will be considered in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter 4 - The
Resurgent Right: Conservatives and Monarchists
Among the vast quantities of literature on the revolution of
1905 and the subsequent decade, a tendency seems to have developed among
commentators to focus largely on the nature and growth of the leftist and
liberal movements to the detriment of the rightists and monarchists. This
chapter intends then to investigate the significant growth of the conservative
and monarchistic right as a reaction to the social destabilization and the
burgeoning calls for reform and revolution that peaked in 1905. The chapter
will further consider how the resurgence of conservatism permeated through
various sections of society, including the prelacy, the gentry and the lower
strata of society.
The
resurfacing of rightist elements within Russia’s socio-political culture
occurred almost simultaneously with the escalation of protest in January 1905.
Rightist thinking varied to a considerable degree, enough to limit the
development of a truly cohesive national movement. It also manifested itself in
a range of ways, from political participation in the duma to street violence.
Rawson has asserted that conservatism took two basic strategies in the
post-1905 environment: an aggressive attitude which demanded a return to the
traditional political system, and also a more defensive posture, which accepted
the changes but repudiated further political reform (1995:2). In essence,
Rawson is defining the difference between out-and-out reactionaries, who tended
to be in the minority, and traditional conservative elements which were more
varied and diverse, encapsulating groups that desired the preservation of the
traditional political structure not only for the sake of the monarchy but also
for their own ends. Of course, the Russian right naturally consisted of a wide
spectrum of political ideas and characteristics. Therefore, drawing a line
between ‘reactionaries’ and ‘conservatives’ is a little artificial and
simplistic as inevitably there was a great degree of interaction and convergence.
The
most explicit and egregious symptom of the resurgence of conservatism was the
pogroms that reached their peak in the immediate aftermath of the October
Manifesto, claiming ‘several thousand lives across Russia’ (Chubarov 1999:147).
These, although sometimes spontaneous, were often promoted and instigated by
extreme right-wing organisations, which had established quasi-paramilitary
wings termed boevye druzhiny, or ‘fighting squads’. There came into existence a
multitude of extreme right organisations which largely failed to formulate any
detailed and systematic political program but generally adhered to the concepts
of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. The majority of these associations
were small and elitist, consisting of aristocrats, bureaucrats and the gentry.
The organisation which became the most prominent, however, was the Union of the
Russian People (URP henceforth) which managed to achieve a notable degree of
popular support. The URP was not only involved in street violence but also had
an assassination program which targeted members of the left and liberal
parties. Among those murdered was the prominent Duma deputy and Kadet Mikhail
Herzenstein. In fact, those convicted of his murder, members of the URP, were
pardoned by the Tsar (Rawson 1995:135). The Tsar exhibited a clear affinity for
the right-wing organisations, often willing to grant them an audience and even,
as is well recorded, accepting a URP badge from the party’s leader Alexander
Dubrovin (Mehlinger and Thompson 1972:58). More and more evidence is also being
found that the government, under the direction of Stolypin and the Tsar,
allotted significant portions of state revenue for the purpose of funding
various pro-autocratic organisations. The memoirs of Deputy Minister of
Internal Affairs, S.E. Kryzhanovskii, attest to this, stating that he was
granted an annual sum of three million rubles to dispense to
government-friendly parties and organisations (cited in Ascher 1992:276).
The
political organisation of the far-right that intensified in 1905 and 1906 was
presented with one major obstacle. As ardent monarchists, they principally
opposed any idea of parliamentarism and democratic participation which largely
explains why there was little right-wing political activity before 1905. After
all, prior to the October Manifesto the right could hardly have been better
represented – both the Tsar and much of the bureaucracy were conservative.
However, with the legalisation of political organisation and the convocation of
the State Duma, ultra-conservatives had to decide whether they were prepared to
contradict their fundamental political doctrine: should they partake in
elections so as to incapacitate the legislature or just reject the new system
wholesale? Some decided to eschew transforming into parliamentary political
parties, such as the Union of Russian Men, whereas the majority, including the
URP and the Russian Assembly, participated in elections to the Duma. In this
they were clearly unsuccessful, in the first Duma having negligible
representation. This was a reflection of the relatively limited support they
received from ordinary Russians and also poor organisation and limited
understanding of electioneering. While elections to the second Duma proved more
successful, the right-wing remained a very small contingent, and not until the
electoral change of 1907 did the extreme right achieve any significant
representation, having 51 officials elected to the third Duma (Manning
1982:327). Rawson, however, makes the astute point that the concept of an
independent movement to support the autocracy, whether prepared to work within
the new political system or not, ‘meant interference in Tsarist affairs. The
result would be to debase the image of autocratic power which by its very
nature did not depend on external support’ (1995:24).
The
social revolt that developed during 1905, especially the unrest in the
countryside that proliferated late in the year, also evoked a more moderate
strain of conservatism largely led by the gentry and aristocratic classes. The
apparent strength of the revolutionary parties and their radical demands, such
as the expropriation of private land, naturally provoked indignation on the
part of those who had the most to lose. Various parties were established that
aimed to represent the interests of the industrialists and business classes,
for example the Trade-Industrial Party in Moscow. These factions inevitably had
a narrow base of popular appeal and were extremely fragmented, thus rendering
them of little political importance (Mehlinger and Thompson 1972:255). The
organisation that came to symbolise the interests of the ‘middle’ and ‘upper’
classes on a much wider scale was the United Nobility, which unified previously
disparate noble groupings, such as the Patriotic Union, at its constituent
assembly in May 1906. Many of the gentry who had flirted with liberal ideas
prior to 1905 swung to the right when presented with social disorder and
attacks upon themselves and their property (Ascher 1992:373). Furthermore,
buoyed by the government’s firm reassertion of order, many of the land owners
who had grudgingly acceded to the possibility of social reform at the apex of
the revolution now began to proscribe reformism as the threat of revolution was
past. The gentry’s attitude toward the new legislature was quite ambivalent:
some opposed the idea of a Duma in that impinged on the monarch’s prerogatives,
although alternately many held that a Duma might be able to counter the
influence of the bureaucracy and act in an advisory capacity to the Tsar. What
the land owners and aristocracy essentially feared was that the Duma, as
stipulated by the October Manifesto, was granted too much influence in the
government of the country and, moreover, that the franchise law in December
1905 ‘offered too great a scope to “unreliable” elements’ (Waldron 1998:135).
The
gentry’s apprehensions were confirmed as the composition of the first and
second Duma was dominated by the left and liberals. The United Nobility feared
that the government may come to a compromise with the Duma, and were even more
alarmed when some government ministers, including Prince Vasilchikov, suggested
that expropriation of private lands might be necessary (Manning 1982:302). Some
nobles, in their dismay, even went as far as to reprimand the Tsar for being
too weak in the defense of his own autocratic privileges. Consequently, the
United Nobility utilised their contacts within the government and the Tsar’s
court to undermine the government-Duma rapprochement and to stymie negotiations
to incorporate Duma deputies within the cabinet. Deputy Interior Minister
Gurko, a member of the United Nobility, along with other officials with ties to
the nobles’ organisation constantly lobbied for the dissolution of the first Duma
and were eventually successful in acquiring Chairman Goremykin’s assent
(Manning 1982:256-8). ‘The rightists’ influence on the central administration
was more apparent not at the political hub, but at a social level among the
nobility’ (Bokhanov 1999:211). There are grounds to challenge this proposition
however. The pressure that the United Nobility brought to bear on the
government and the Tsar was not merely limited to back channels and personal
encounters but was increasingly realised through the new political system. In
the pre-war period over thirty percent of the State Council were members of the
United Nobility (Waldron 1998:137). Furthermore, the failure of the government
to compromise with the left-liberal Dumas compounded with unwillingness on its
part to revert back to the pre-1905 political system led to a compromise
policy: the changing of the electoral law so that the Duma was composed of more
‘reliable’ deputies – in other words the autocracy’s traditional allies, the
gentry and aristocracy. Thus the third and fourth Dumas were controlled by a
combination of the right and the Octobrists (Seton-Watson 1967:628 and 636/7).
The conservative gentry now had both informal and official methods of
influence, using this to block reform efforts it deemed contrary to its
interests, such as Chairman Stolypin’s plans to reorganise local administration
and elections to the zemstvos (Waldron 1998:139).
The
other sector of Russian society that came to the aid of the autocracy was the
Orthodox Church although, like the gentry and aristocracy, its support was not
absolute. There was certainly a strong commitment to the notion of autocratic
rule and revulsion toward revolutionary violence, as well as condemnation of
the irreligious and cosmopolitan character of the socialists and the belief in
national and religious minorities’ rights among liberals. Thus, for ‘the
duration of the revolutionary turmoil, most bishops staunchly defended the
existing order’ (Freeze 1999:273). Some members within the Church even forged
links with the far-right movement and the ‘Black Hundreds’ (Harcave 1964:151).
However, the Church became progressively more alienated from the state as it
believed its privileged status was being diminished. The revolution had forced
the Tsar, in an edict on 17th April 1905, to concede greater
liberties to religious minorities. Relations were embittered further when the
Duma insisted on further religious reform and Stolypin’s cabinet proposed
certain bills which promoted religious tolerance (Freeze 1999:275/6).
In conclusion, it clear that while the Tsar’s base of popular support had gradually eroded during the late 19th century, in the immediate years after the revolution there still existed significant segments of the population willing to prop up the monarchy and Russia’s traditional social structures. A minority of Russian’s within both the lower and upper strata of society were still devoted to the idea of the paternal and omnipotent Tsar and opposed the recognition of national minority rights, especially those of the Jews. Some saw liberalism and the extension of civil liberties as a danger to their Orthodox Christian faith, and while Church-state relations had begun to deteriorate, the prelacy, at least initially, was inclined to affiliate itself to the monarchy. The gentry also still maintained its traditional alliance to the Tsar, although many nobles embraced the opportunity the Duma represented to voice their interests and concerns. It could be said, then, that the government could still lean on the gentry and the Church for legitimacy and it certainly did this – witness the change to the electoral law in June 1907. Disconcertingly for the government, however, its relationship with these two groups was growing uneasy: the Church’s and gentry’s support became increasingly conditional on the recognition of their interests which they felt, rightly so, was being endangered by the government’s moderate reform efforts.
Conclusion - Russia: Before and After
Imperial
Russia in the 19th century, like many of its European neighbours,
clearly underwent a fundamental political and social change, a process
encapsulated by the rather elusive and ambiguous term ‘modernisation’. Russian
rulers continually postponed reform to the point when concerns for the nation’s
international power and prestige forced them to act, such as defeat in the
Crimea for instance. It is certainly worth asking: was this lack of political
intiative and poor governance inherent in the autocratic system or was it more
attributable to poor political leadership? A fair case could be made for both.
The political system clearly isolated the Tsars from the increasingly diverse
and complex needs of their subjects. The idea that the monarch held unlimited
power, that this was the natural and unchangeable state of Russian politics,
and that general society could not and should not exert influence on this were
characteristics of the Tsarist system in the 19th century. Thus, the
social tensions that developed during this period were too often perceived to
be the work of small seditious organisations and not representative of the
general populace. However, unrest, centred within the four main social groups
outlined by Harcave (1964:19-26) as mentioned in chapter one, clearly had organic
and popular roots.
Equally however, the leadership of the individual Tsars, and especially Nicholas II, must come under scrutiny. There are various examples in modern history, perhaps Meiji Japan being the best, where a monarchical institution has successfully modernised without the destruction of the monarchy itself. The responsibility for the failure of Tsardom to adapt to the inevitable difficulties of Russian modernisation, therefore, is as much the responsibility of the Tsars as the political system. However, it is important not to overestimate the politicisation of the Russian population and their opposition to Tsarist rule on the eve of 1905. Grievances were more often economic in nature – after all, the revolution continued well into 1907 in spite of the political concessions embodied in the October Manifesto. Arguably then these economic problems could have been avoided or at least mitigated by appropriate government policies. On a similar note, the war with Japan, which contributed significantly to social unrest, must be predominantly seen as the fault of the Tsar and the political leadership.
While it has been established that 1905 was far from just a revolt against Tsarist rule as a concept in itself, the revolution certainly intensified the process of politicisation experienced by many Russians. 1905 witnessed the birth of the soviets and the increasing organisation and activity of political groups. Nicholas’ decision in October to endorse basic civil liberties and a Russian parliament gave this process official legitimacy, and certainly represented fundamental and revolutionary changes to the political system. The October Manifesto naturally gave voice to not only those principally opposed to Tsarism but also those groups that still believed in the political primacy and divine leadership of the Tsar. Although the October Manifesto provided an institutional base for cooperation between government and society, this in itself did not serve to moderate Russian politics. At first, as the early Dumas evidence, it merely showcased and even intensified Russia’s political polarisation. ‘The opposition wanted to change the entire system overnight; the authorities clung to the belief that they could rule as they had for centuries’ (Ascher 1992:369). Confronted with this situation, the Tsar and his officials were progressively inclined to arbitrarily curtail civil liberties and, by enacting the Electoral Law in June 1907, once again attempted to isolate themselves from the society they were intended to govern. While the revolution may have abated, the political issues that had contributed to the revolt were far from resolved.
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Alex
Chubarov (2009) All Russias [online]
available from <http://www.allrussias.com/index.asp> [20 January 2010]
Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress (2009) A Country Study: Russia [online] available from < http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/rutoc.html> [10 March 2010]