“At present, we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the Party now and for the future – with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality” (Khrushchev 1956). When these words were delivered by Khrushchev to a closed session at the Twentieth Party Congress on February 1956, it was clear that there would be a great change in the system of the Soviet Union. The denunciation of Stalin, and the repudiation of a number of his policies, would begin a process of reform that affected all aspects of Soviet life. No factors were left unaltered, as the dismantling of the cult of personality allowed reforms in terms of state coercion and terror, socialist legality, the arts and culture, the economy, foreign policy and the standard of living of Soviet citizens.

In order to assess Khrushchev’s successes the aims of de-stalinisation must first be identified. By damaging the legality of the revolution, a result of transferring legitimacy from the original ideology towards his own person, Stalin had left no indication on which direction the Soviet Union should follow after his death (Tompson 1993: 83). However, through undermining the cult of personality that had surrounded Stalin, Khrushchev affirmed a movement towards collective leadership and a return to Leninist principles (Volkogonov 1999: 204) (McCauley 1986: 168). Therefore de-Stalinisation was required in order to re-establish the authority of the Communist party and Lenin, by moving away from the tyranny that was Stalin’s legacy (Filtzer 1993: 44) (Tompson 1993: 85).

As well as the problems of future leadership, the Soviet Union was facing economic difficulties, both agricultural and industrial, as a result of dissatisfaction and stagnation (Filtzer 1993: 13). In order to remedy these problems, Khrushchev had to explain the failures of the system, in order to justify advocating radical reforms, balancing the economy and renewing the mobilization of the people through a relatively limited liberalization and a developing standard of living (McCauley 1987: 3) (Lynch 1990: 101). The only way to enact these reforms, and move the country into a more progressive direction without risking the legitimacy of the party was to undermine Stalin’s role, using his failures as an explanation.

The undermining of Stalin’s legacy also enabled Khrushchev to attempt the alteration of foreign policy, by seeking a change in the relationship with Eastern Europe, and pursuing peaceful coexistence with the West (Service 2007: 311-312) (Lynch 1990: 101). However, Khrushchev’s aims were not consistently selfless, as de-Stalinisation was also a tool that could assist in removing political rivals, who were more affiliated with Stalin, in order to progress his own powers (McCauley 1987: 3) (Chubarov 2001: 135).