This essay will argue that whilst Imperial Russia witnessed tremendous industrial growth between 1881 and 1914 the necessary development of socio-political reforms did not keep pace. There are two views of Russia during this period firstly the ‘optimistic’ view which sees the eventual development of an industrialised and liberal democratic Russia and the second is the ‘pessimistic’ view that the violent overthrow of the regime was inevitable. This essay will analyse the economic development of Russia and show that without the intervention of the First World War and the revolution Russia was well placed to become a leading industrial power. However the regime, and in particular the Tsar, was unable and unwilling to reform the autocracy into a genuine constitutional monarchy complete with a liberal democratic constitution. Firstly the essay will look at Russia’s industrialisation before turning its focus upon the socio-political issues and the manner in which the regime confronted them.

For Russia the defeat in the Crimean War brought into stark relief the gap between its great power pretentions and its capabilities (Kochan 1962: 163). The fact that the British and French had managed to ship supplies to the front faster than Russia could send hers internally highlighted the need for reform in the traditional set up of the Tsarist regime (Dukes 1998: 134). The need for reform was now recognised and led directly to the ‘Great Reforms’ of Alexander II (1855-81), even so no great movement towards the industrialisation of Russia occurred during his reign.  The first minister of finance under Alexander III (1881-94), Nikolai Bunge, tried to commit to an orthodox economic policy of a balanced budget, offsetting progress against revenue. When he could no longer maintain this balance due to expenditure on military campaigns he was replaced.

In 1886 Ivan Vyshnegradskii became the new minister of finance and he tried to find the majority of the finance needed for industrial expansion from internal resources. He sought to reduce consumption, via increases in taxes and import duties, and therefore to create a budget surplus that could be used to finance industrial expansion. Vyshnegradskii negotiated foreign loans on favourable grounds due to his financial stringency; these loans were required to kick-start the industrialisation of the Russian economy (Rogger 1983: 101). The Trans-Siberian railway project was launched in 1891 and would consist of 4000 miles of track. This development of the Russian railways would induce an expansion of heavy industry by their need for coal and steel for rails and factories and workshops to produce and repair locomotives.

The famine of 1891-92 and the cholera and typhus epidemics that followed were partly blamed upon the policies of Vyshnegradskii and resulted in his resignation in 1891. He had used the sale of grain to part finance industrialisation; many of his opponents in government felt too much had been taken from the peasants. The costs of combating the famine ruined his careful management of the budget by reducing the surplus he had painstakingly accrued through the purchase of relief aid such as horses and seed grain (Rogger 1983: 35-36).