The process of the institutionalisation of "new thinking" proceeded
along a number of directions, each discussed in a separate section
of this chapter. These main directions were: (1) a major
restructuring of the Soviet foreign policy institutions and
personnel; (2) the elevation of functional groups associated with
the new ideas; (3) the breaking of the military's monopoly on
security and defence issues; and (4) increasing the powers of the
legislature in order to create a mechanism of checks and balances in
foreign-policy decision-making. |
Restructuring the Foreign Policy Establishment |
In order to gain greater personal control over the formation and
execution of Soviet policy, Gorbachev started by carrying out a
major restructuring of Soviet foreign-policy personnel and
institutions. The most important change was the July 1985
replacement of Andrei Gromyko. In his 28-year tenure as foreign
minister, Gromyko had acquired a unique and unparalleled grasp
of world affairs. But when the frail health of the late Soviet
leader Yuri Andropov and the foreign policy inexperience of his
successor, Konstantin Chernenko, enhanced Gromyko's power,
Soviet policy began to display increasing rigidity, particularly
after the INF walkout.
Gromyko's nominal promotion to Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet ended his day-to-day control of Soviet foreign
policy, but as a powerful Politburo member he still had to be
handled with care. With the exception of the Shevardnadze
appointment as Foreign Minister in 1985, Gorbachev made no
personnel changes in the foreign policy realm that would have
offended Gromyko, even though large numbers of officials in
other ministries were being replaced /Hough 1987; 32/. The
75-year-old minister of foreign trade, Nikolay Patolichev, was
retired in November and replaced by Gromyko's deputy minister
for Eastern Europe. A new deputy minister of foreign affairs for
personnel was also appointed. But that was all. At the beginning
of 1986, Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov - the old foreign policy
assistant of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko - remained in his
post, as did the Central Committee secretary who headed the
International Department (the 80-year-old Boris Ponomarev) and
the Central Committee secretary who headed the Department for
Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist
Countries (the 76year-old Konstantin Rusakov). Even more
surprising, none of the nine deputy heads of these two
departments had been replaced /Ibid/.
In the aftermath of the 27th Congress Gorbachev began to move
more confidently in changing foreign policy officials. At the
end of January 1986, Aleksandrov-Agentov retired, and then in
February and March, Rusakov and Ponomarev were replaced as
Central Committee secretaries. By August, only one of
Gromyko's eight deputy ministers remained, and nine new deputy
ministers had been appointed.
Along with these removals of high-level officials came wholesale changes in the Soviet diplomatic corps; in just the first
two years Gorbachev was in power, Soviet ambassadors were
replaced in 60% (74 of 124) of the countries maintaining full
diplomatic relations with the USSR, including nine of the 16
members of NATO. Ambassadorial replacements continued at a
breakneck pace during Gorbachev's next two years in office; as a
result, only 15% (19 of 128) of the pre-1985 ambassadors
remained in their posts by March 1989, including just two in
NATO countries /Kramer 1991; 450/.
Such sweeping changes in personnel became possible as a result
of Gorbachev's firm control over the foreign policy
establishment, which he was able to exercise through the
appointments of Eduard Shevardnadze and Anatoly Dobrynin to head
the Foreign Ministry and the International Department,
respectively. Dobrynin, who, prior to his new job, had been
Ambassador to USA since 1962, was a prominent advocate of new
thinking. Shevardnadze, who had known Gorbachev since the late
1950s when they worked as top Komsomol officials in two
neibouring regions, was a politician prepared to listen and
accept new formulae and approaches. Gorbachev undoubtedly
intended Dobrynin to serve long enough to provide needed advice
(especially about US-Soviet relations) and maintain stronger
party control over foreign policy while enabling Shevardnadze to
gain greater experience and establish a solid presence as
foreign minister.
Dobrynin's potential influence in the Foreign Ministry was
enhanced by the appointment of the new first deputy foreign
minister, Yuly Vorontsov, who had been one of Dobrynin's closest
aides in Washington for 11 years in the 1960s and 1970s. Three
of the new deputy ministers - Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Vadim
Loginov and Igor Rogachev - also had close ties to Dobrynin from
earlier stints in Washington. The International Department was
further strengthened by the appointment of Anatoly Chernyaev,
who had been deputy head of the ID, to be a special foreign
policy assistant to Gorbachev /Kramer 1991; 450/. Thus,
Dobrynin's position in the bureaucracy was solidified by an
interlocking network of high-level officials in the
International Department and the Foreign Ministry.
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