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The Nature of Putin’s Statism |
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Traditional Role of the State |
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the state represented the highest aspiration of the
society for survival in conditions of adversity, most recently tested in the
Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945
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at the same time the state represented the greatest
danger to society itself, as evidenced in the Stalinist purges and the
Brezhnevite suffocation of civil society
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Models of State Reformation under
Putin (Richard Sakwa) |
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Arguments in Favour of “Pluralistic” Statism |
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Putin’s commitment to the maintenance of the
principles of the existing constitution
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the attempt to establish the uniform application of
constitutional and other legal norms across Russia in a uniform and
homogeneous way
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Putin’s statism represented an advance for democracy
in the sense that the application of the law would be uniform for all,
including regional bosses, oligarchs, and the presidency itself
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a strong state should be rooted in a liberal economic
order and a vibrant civil society
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his statism is a normative (that is, legal and
constitutional) reconstitution of state power
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Putin’s departure in 2008 according to the
constitution represented a major advance for democracy
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Arguments in Favour of “Compacted” Statism |
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the selective approach to the abuses of the Yel’tsin
era
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the weak commitment to media freedom and human rights
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the dependence of the presidential regime on ‘power
structures’: the bureaucracy, the security apparatus and official state
parties
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a new type of hegemonic party system is being
established based on a neo-nomenklatura class of state officials (members of
“United Russia”)
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the development of a personalised regime
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the presidency failed to encourage the development of
a genuine rule of law
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the political regime was not rendered adequately
accountable to the representative system (political parties and legislative
assemblies)
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all this points to a less benign form of statism: the
‘reconcentration’ of the state
Copyrighted material
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