|
|
|
|
The Law on State Enterprises |
|
"Gorbachev Factor"
|
The
problem, however, was that most of his reform measures were
spontaneous and did not foresee many negative consequences. Several
steps, in particular, taken from 1988 on, proved fateful and
self-defeating. The first of these was connected with his plan to
create financial incentives for enterprises and to encourage them to
show more initiative and independence in their economic activity. To
this end, the Law on State Enterprises was adopted that came into
effect in 1988. |
|
The
new law’s central idea was to allow each state enterprise, no matter
how large or small, to dispose of its share of budget allocation
independently, without commands and instructions from Moscow. The
reformers hoped that if factories were free to administer their own
budget and to fix prices for their output, they would have greater
incentives to improve their performance and profitability. Moreover,
they would be motivated to look actively for their own (and not
imposed by Moscow) suppliers and subcontractors, thus setting up
effective producer networks within and between regions.
|
Gorbachev and his economic advisers hoped that the new law would
unleash the initiative of enterprise managers and infuse the
stagnating socialist economy with elements of competition. However,
many company directors were not prepared psychologically to turn
into responsible independent managers. Instead of restructuring
production and improving quality, they preferred to raise the prices
of their products and increase the wages of their work force.
Instead of looking for suppliers and partners across the Soviet
Union, they turned for help to local party-state administrators.
The
law increased the dependence of companies on local government, and
the supervision of the economy by all-union ministries was seriously
undermined. The law dealt a powerful blow to the Communist
centralized managerial system before any viable alternative was put
in its place.
Copyrighted material
|
|
|
|
Soviet Russia |
|
|
|
Images &
Video |
|


 |
|