"Gorbachev Factor"
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The
next fateful decision concerned the reform of economic management in
general. The traditional system established by Stalin had been based
on the political supremacy of the Communist Party. Party bodies
played a key role in sorting out problems in relations between
enterprises. Depending on the scale of a problem, it was resolved by
district, city, regional, or republic party committees. If a problem
was of an all-union magnitude, it was placed before the party’s
Central Committee. In short, party structures were the “blood
vessels” of the command-bureaucratic system, ensuring its smooth
operation. |
In
the postwar period, as the complexity of the Soviet economy grew,
this system became less and less effective. First party secretaries
in the regions and even Central Committee officials were often
poorly qualified to make important decisions in specialized branches
of production.
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Gorbachev thought that he could make the economy more efficient by
curtailing the interference of the party bureaucracy in economic
manage-ment. He announced that the party’s main concern should be
ideology and that any intrusion in matters of production should cease.
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In
addition to undermining the role of the party bodies as economic
mediators, Gorbachev sought to liberalize economic management by
dismantling all-union ministries, portrayed as “monsters” of the
command-bureaucratic economy. Civil servants, working in economic
bureaucracies, were disparaged as parasites who produced nothing and
yet had the power to determine economic activity across the entire
country from a single center. The result of Gorbachev’s onslaught on
the ministries was a speedy dissolution of less important ministries
and drastic job cuts in more important ones. In a year, the staff of
central ministries was reduced from 1.7 million to 700,000. This was
extolled as a triumph of the reformist leadership over the old
command system.
However, the drastic weakening of the central ministries only
accelerated the disintegration of interregional ties between
enterprises. The substantial reduction of the ministries’ functions,
as well as the diminished role of the party structures, damaged the
“blood vessels” that integrated the economic space of the Soviet
Union. Freed from the arbitrary meddling of party officials and the
pervasive control of central planners, the Soviet economy, far from
being able to revive, began a rapid descend into chaos.
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